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Abstract
Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually; two parties reach inter-
mediate agreements without knowing the whole range of possibilities. These
intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds.
Cooperative bargaining solutions ignore these dynamics and can therefore
yield accurate predictions only if they are robust to its speci￿cation. We
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1identify robustness criteria which are satis￿ed by four of the best-known bar-
gaining solutions, the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, Proportional and Discrete
Rai⁄a solutions. We show that the ￿robustness of intermediate agreements￿
plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide the ￿rst charac-
terization of the Discrete Rai⁄a solution and novel axiomatizations of the
other three solutions. Hence, we provide a uni￿ed framework for comparing
these solutions￿bargaining theories.
JEL classi￿cation: C78; D74
Keywords: Nash￿ s bargaining problem, robustness, intermediate agree-
ments, the Discrete Rai⁄a solution, the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, Proportional solutions.
1 Introduction
Nash￿ s bargaining problem is a pair (S;d), where S ￿ R2 is a convex and compact
utility possibility set and d is the disagreement point, the utility allocation that
results if no agreement is reached by the parties. A bargaining solution f associates
each problem (S;d) with a unique point in S: Since Nash￿ s (1950) seminal solution
and axioms, various other solutions and axioms have been proposed.
One prominent axiom is the Step-by-Step Negotiation (SSN) axiom (Kalai,
1977). SSN requires that the bargaining outcome be invariant under decomposition
of the bargaining process into stages: if parties know that they will face two nested
sets in sequence, ￿rst a subset S of the set of feasible alternatives T and then T;
then the solution outcome of the initial problem can function as an intermediate
agreement for the subsequent problem. Kalai (1977) emphasized the advantage of
SSN as follows:
This principle is observed in actual negotiations (e.g., Kissinger￿ s
2step-by-step), and it is attractive since it makes the implementation
of a solution easier. It is also attractive because we can view every
bargaining situation that we encounter in life as a ￿rst step in a se-
quence of predictable or unpredictable bargaining situations that may
still arise. Thus, the outcome of the current bargaining situation will
be the threat point for the future ones.
Indeed, most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually; parties reach intermedi-
ate agreements without knowing the whole range of future possibilities, and these
intermediate agreements serve as new disagreement points and pave the way for
subsequent negotiations.1 Cooperative bargaining solutions ignore these dynamics
and can therefore yield accurate predictions only if they are robust to its speci￿-
cation. SSN does provide a substantial robustness test. When two parties face an
uncertain bargaining prospect in which the problem could be either (S;d) or (T;e)
with d = e and S ￿ T; SSN then suggests that they can reach an intermediate
agreement at f(S;d) before uncertainty is resolved, as moving the disagreement
point from d to f(S;d) has no e⁄ect to the bargaining outcome in either (S;d)
or (T;e): We argue, however, that this test is too strong. When two parties con-
sent to reach a point d0 as an intermediate agreement, it is legitimate to say that
1Uncertainty is also resolved gradually in a single-person decision-making situation. A shopper
in a typical supermarket faces more than 200 varieties of cookies, soups and cereals (Schwarz,
2004). The marketing and economics literatures provide well-established analyses and evidence
that consumers do not consider all brands in a given market at once when making a purchase
decision, and that the set of brands they consider changes over time as they learn more about
the product, since the set later includes brands that they were initially unaware of (Chiang,
Chib and Narasimhan, 1999; Goeree, 2008). See Huberman and Regev (2001) regarding ￿nancial
decisions involving plans in a set of hundreds of available funds, and Dawes and Brown (2004)
regarding university choices. Also see Rubinstein and Salant (2006) for a theoretical model in
which individuals encounter the alternatives sequentially.
3they expect to maintain the same relative bargaining position when moving from
d to d0: Accordingly, SSN implies that, regardless of the form of the expansion T
of S, f(S;d) and d give them the same relative bargaining position! One would
not expect parties to reach intermediate agreements within S ￿ and especially
the solution outcome of S as an intermediate agreement ￿ even if they knew
that the ultimate set T would contain S, unless some additional things about the
relationship between S and T were also known.
Here, a class of weaker robustness tests is proposed. We consider a situation
where two parties face an uncertain bargaining prospect in which the problem could
be either (S;d) or (T;e) with d = e: Each test requires the parties to be able to
reach an intermediate agreement when S and T conform to a speci￿c relationship.
We require such an intermediate agreement to be robust, that is, if we replace the
initial disagreement point by it, it has no e⁄ect to the bargaining outcome. Below
is a list of the circumstances of the robustness tests that we will consider here for
this purpose.
1. S is included in T.
2. S and T have the same ideal payo⁄s ￿ i.e., each party￿ s highest possible
individually rational payo⁄ is the same in both S and T ￿ and S and T
need not include one another.
3. The parties expect to receive the same relative payo⁄ gains in S and T, and
S and T need not include one another.
4. The parties expect to make the same relative concessions in S and T, and S
and T need not include one another.
Thus, in the ￿rst weakening of SSN￿ s robustness test, certain points can serve
as intermediate agreements whenever the bargaining sets S and T are nested, but
4any such intermediate agreement is not necessarily the solution outcome of S. In
our second robustness test, certain points can serve as intermediate agreements
whenever S and T share the same ideal point. Likewise, in the third and fourth
robustness tests, certain points can serve as intermediate agreements whenever the
parties expect to have either the same relative gains (in Criterion 3) or the same
relative concessions (in Criterion 4) in both S and T.
The above four robustness tests will be termed ￿Robustness of Intermediate
Agreements￿(RIA) axioms. Each of these RIA axioms ￿ when combined with
some other well-known and plausible axioms ￿ will lead to the axiomatization of
the Discrete Rai⁄a solution (the ￿rst such that we know of for this solution2), as
well as of the Nash, Kalai/Smorodinsky and Proportional solutions. Our results
can be brie￿ y summarized as follows:
(1) The Discrete Rai⁄a solution is characterized by the Midpoint Domination
(MD) axiom, an RIA axiom, and the Independence of Non-Midpoint Dominating
Alternatives (INMD) axiom.
(2) The Nash solution is characterized by MD, an RIA axiom, and the Dis-
agreement Point Continuity (DCONT) axiom.
(3) The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution is characterized by MD, an RIA axiom,
DCONT and the Strong Disagreement Point Monotonicity (SDM) axiom.
(4) The Proportional solutions are characterized by an RIA axiom, DCONT,
the Weak Pareto Optimality axiom (WPO), the Pareto Continuity (PCONT) ax-
iom and the Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) axiom.
2The most desirable feature of Rai⁄a￿ s contribution, namely its description of the bargaining
process, has nevertheless led researchers to seek ￿ and provide characterizations of ￿ a ￿contin-
uous￿version of the Rai⁄a solution (Livne, 1989, and Peters and van Damme, 1991). In addition,
we have very recently been informed by Walter Trockel that in a few months he will send us a
manuscript of his which contains an axiomatic characterization of the Discrete Rai⁄a solution.
5Hence, we provide a uni￿ed framework for comparing these solutions￿bargain-
ing theories.
We will now consider an example in which two agents face an uncertain negoti-
ation prospect, such that writing a contingent binding agreement regarding either
of the two potential utility possibility sets is not possible. Consider a country with
two major political parties that could win the up-coming elections. Depending on
which party wins, the new government will provide ￿rms in major sectors with
either (1) tax breaks or (2) trade protection. Suppose that there are two major
automobile companies in the country with su¢ cient production synergies between
them. Given a prevailing recession in the country, it is taken for granted that
these ￿rms will tacitly be allowed to collude in the product market, regardless of
the policy that will be pursued after the elections.
Observe that each policy will generate a di⁄erent utility possibility set between
the two automobile companies. The ￿tax break￿policy with tacit collusion will
generate a utility possibility set S, and the ￿trade protection￿policy with tacit
collusion will generate the set T. The disagreement point d involves their current
pro￿ts. If these companies choose to wait, doing nothing until the new government
gets elected and announces its policy, they will obtain d (note that they cannot
write an overt contingent binding agreement since overt collusion is prohibited by
law). However, they can instead reach an intermediate agreement d0 > d in the
meantime. The intermediate agreement d0 may involve forming a research joint
venture (RJV); such an RJV can pave the way for their tacit collusion, regardless
of the actual policy that the new government will announce.3
3Another example considers two high-tech research engineers who work in the same ￿eld. In
the future, the government will adopt one of the two possibilities: (1) to subsidize some expensive
strategic equipment or (2) to provide generous progressive tax deductions to individuals￿earnings
that will accrue in research teams. Here too, each policy will generate a di⁄erent utility possibility
6Note that since an intermediate agreement d0 may possibly a⁄ect the bargain-
ing solution outcome of any potential utility possibility set di⁄erently from the
way in which the initial disagreement point d would, the ideal situation would be
for the agents to agree on an intermediate agreement d0 > d which is robust: if
both agents adhere to the same particular sharing rule (in the form of a bargaining
solution), regardless of which utility possibility set is realized, it would not matter
later whether they move to the bargaining solution outcome of the realized utility
possibility set from (i) the intermediate agreement d0 or (ii) their initial disagree-
ment point d. Otherwise ￿ i.e., if the intermediate agreement a⁄ects their future
bargaining solution outcome di⁄erently from the way in which the initial disagree-
ment point would have ￿ at least one of the agents would not be willing to agree
to the intermediate agreement.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
provide a brief review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, we de￿ne some basic
solutions and axioms, and in Section 4, we propose and discuss the motives for
set between the two engineers who are the players. Suppose that the ￿subsidy￿policy regarding
the major strategic equipment will generate a particular utility possibility set S and the ￿tax
deduction￿ policy will generate the set T. Their initial disagreement point d involves their
current earnings. If these individuals choose to wait and do nothing until the actual policy is
announced, they will be obtaining d in the meantime. However, they could instead decide to
reach an interim outcome d0 > d in the meantime. The interim outcome d0 might involve renting
o¢ ce space together; they can use the joint o¢ ce space regardless of whether they then use
the expensive strategic equipment together without forming a research team, or start working
as a research team without buying the expensive strategic equipment, which would not pay o⁄
without the subsidy.
4When the uncertainty cannot be resolved quickly (or will re-surface frequently), at least one
of the parties may be better o⁄ using a series of intermediate agreements in time instead of com-
mitting to binding long-term agreements. This may also be the case if the feasible intermediate
agreements are not neutral.
7our RIA axioms. Section 5 provides characterizations of the Discrete Rai⁄a, Nash,
Kalai/Smorodinsky and Proportional solutions. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Relevant Literature
The signi￿cance and fundamental role of bargaining5 were recognized as early as
1881 by Edgeworth, but for a very long time it was deemed to lack a clear solution.6
In 1950, Nash proposed a framework which allowed a unique feasible outcome to be
selected as the solution outcome of each given problem. Nash (1950) also provided
the ￿rst axiomatic derivation of a bargaining solution, characterized by four ax-
ioms ￿ namely WPO, Symmetry (SYM), Scale Invariance (SI), and Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Rai⁄a (1953) later criticized the Nash solution
(and especially the IIA axiom), and proposed another solution which essentially
described a discrete bargaining process, but which has never been characterized
axiomatically. More then twenty years later, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) raised
similar criticisms and characterized a new solution which, like the Discrete Rai⁄a
solution, emphasized the parties￿ideal payo⁄s.7
Initially, all characterizations employed an independence or monotonicity ax-
iom pertaining to changes in the feasible set (pioneered by Nash, 1950, and Kalai
5Binmore (1994, p. 21): ￿much negotiation in real life ... create[s] a surplus that would
otherwise be unavailable ... If you have a fancy house to sell that is worth $2m to you and $3m
to me, then ... a surplus of $1m is available for us to split.￿
6See Roth (1979b, p. 5).
7There have been other solution concepts characterized axiomatically since then: the Egali-
tarian solution (Kalai, 1977; Roth, 1979a), the Equal Sacri￿ce solution (Aumann and Maschler,
1985; Chun, 1988), the Perles/Maschler solution (Perles and Maschler, 1981), the Equal Area so-
lution (Anbarci, 1993; Anbarci and Bigelow, 1994), the Average Payo⁄ solution (Anbarci, 1995),
and the Dictatorial solutions (Bigelow and Anbarci, 1993).
8and Smorodinsky, 1975, respectively).8 The second generation characterizations
then shifted the focus to changes in the disagreement payo⁄s, as well as to consid-
erations of uncertain disagreement points (pioneered by Thomson, 1987, and Chun
and Thomson, 1990, respectively). These axioms, however, typically did not refer
to any bargaining process.9 By adding such a process to the bargaining frame-
work, Nash￿ s (1953) Demand Game established a new research agenda, which has
commonly been referred to as the Nash program (see Binmore, 1998). It uses the
strategic (non-cooperative) approach to provide non-cooperative foundations for
axiomatic (cooperative) bargaining solutions.10
Later, MD (Sobel, 1981) and the Step-by-Step Negotiation (SSN) axiom (Kalai,
1977)11 embedded a bargaining process by reaching intermediate agreements.12
8When the solution outcome does not respond to changes in the bargaining set, that axiom
is known as the independence axiom; when at least one of solution payo⁄s may be altered
following a change in the bargaining set, it is dubbed the monotonicity axiom. Indeed, the Nash,
Kalai/Smorodinsky, Perles/Maschler, Equal Area, and Average Payo⁄ solutions have all initially
been characterized by SYM, WPO, SI and either an independence or a monotonicity axiom.
9Both generations of characterizations were essential, since a bargaining problem consists of
a bargaining set and a disagreement point, i.e., (S;d).
10This strand of research produced very interesting work accompanying the cooperative bar-
gaining solution concepts, starting with Nash (1953), followed by Moulin (1984), Binmore et al
(1986), Howard (1992), Anbarci (1993), and Anbarci and Boyd III (2009), among others. Out-
side of the Nash bargaining framework, in the cooperative game theory area (with Transferable
Utility in Characteristic Form Games), Gul (1989) provided non-cooperative foundations for the
Shapley Value as well.
11Moulin (1983) used MD to characterize the Nash solution, and Kalai (1977) used SSN to
characterize Proportional solutions (the Egalitarian and Dictatorial solutions are special cases of
the latter).
12Intermediate agreements help eliminate the most lop-sided and/or ine¢ cient portions of
a utility possibility set S, which at least one of the parties would ￿nd undesirable (in e⁄ect,
9However, MD and SSN have not subsequently been generalized to give rise to a class
of axioms which would help in further understanding other prominent solutions.
This paper aims to highlight the implications of the main idea and the crucial
role of robustness in intermediate agreements in a uni￿ed way by proposing and
describing such a class of axioms.
3 Basic De￿nitions
A two-person (bargaining) problem is a pair (S;d); where S ￿ R2 is the set of
utility possibilities that the players can achieve through cooperation and d 2 S is
the disagreement point, which is the utility allocation that results if no agreement
is reached. It is assumed that (1) S is compact, convex and comprehensive (if
x;z 2 S implies that y 2 S for all x ￿ y ￿ z); and (2) x > d for some x 2 S.13 Let
￿ be the class of all two-person problems. Unless otherwise stated, we consider
problems in ￿:14
For all S 2 ￿; let IR(S;d) ￿ fx 2 Sjx ￿ dg; WPO(S) ￿ fx 2 Sj8x0 2 R2
and x0 > x ) x0 = 2 Sg, and PO(S) ￿ fx 2 Sj8x0 2 R2 and x0 ￿ x ) x0 = 2 Sg:
Denote the ideal point of (S;d) as b(S;d) ￿ (b1(S;d);b2(S;d)); where bi(S;d) =
maxfxijx 2 IR(S;d)g,15 and the midpoint of (S;d) is m(S;d) ￿ 1
2(b(S;d) + d): A
the meta-bargaining models of van Damme, 1986, and Anbarci and Yi, 1992, also pertain to
the elimination of portions of S which are deemed undesirable by at least one of the parties).
Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) consider a setup in which each party can invest in his
disagreement payo⁄ to avoid such portions of S and to improve his solution outcome payo⁄.
13Given x;y 2 R2; x > y if xi > yi for each i; and x ￿ y if xi ￿ yi for each i:
14A more restrictive class of bargaining problems is as follows: a bargaining problem (S;d)
is smooth if S admits a unique supporting hyperplane at each utility vector on its boundary.
￿s ￿ ￿ denotes the class of all smooth problems.
15The ideal point is well de￿ned, since S is assumed to be compact.
10solution is a function f : ￿ ! R2 such that for all (S;d) 2 ￿; f 2 S:
The disagreement point set of (S;d) with respect to f; D(S;d;f) ￿ fd0 2
IR(S;d)jf(S;d0)
= f(S;d)g; is the set of all points d0 in S (weakly) dominating d, such that if we
replace d with d0 and keep the utility feasibility set S unchanged, we still reach
the same solution outcome. As will be clear later, D(S;d;f) is be a key element
in our analysis.
Next, we list some basic axioms in the literature.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; f(S;d) 2 WPO(S):
Symmetry (SYM): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; if [d1 = d2; and (x;y) 2 S ) (y;x) 2
S], then f1(S;d) = f2(S;d):
Scale Invariance (SI): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; T = (T1;T2) : R2 ! R2 is a positive
a¢ ne transformation if T(x1;x2) = (a1x1+b1;a2x2+b2) for some positive constants
ai and bi: We require that for such a transformation T; f(T(S);T(d)) = T(f(S;d)):
Individual Rationality (IR): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; f(S;d) ￿ d:
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; fi(S;d) ￿ di; with
strict inequality whenever xi > di for some x 2 S with i = 1;2:
Independence of Non-individually Rational Alternatives (INIR): For
all (S;d) 2 ￿; f(S;d) = f(IR(S;d);d):
Disagreement Point Monotonicity (DM): For all (S;d) 2 ￿; if d and e
are in S with ei = di and ej > dj; then fj(S;e) ￿ fj(S;d); for i;j = 1;2 with i 6= j:
Strong Disagreement Point Monotonicity (SDM): The same as DM, but
with ￿>￿in the conclusion instead of ￿￿￿ , if such a point f(S;e) exists.
Disagreement Point Continuity (DCONT): For all (S;d) 2 ￿ and every
sequence d1;d2;::: in S; if limn!1 dn = d 2 S (in the Hausdor⁄ topology), then
limn!1 f(S;dn) = f(S;d):
Pareto Continuity (PCONT): For all sequences f(Sn;dn)g 2 ￿ and (S;d) 2
11￿;if WPO(Sn) converges to WPO(S) in the Hausdor⁄ topology and dn = d for
all n, then limn!1 f(Sn;dn) = f(S;d):
Midpoint Domination (MD): For any (S;d) 2 ￿; f(S;d) ￿ m(S;d):
MD requires that the agreement Pareto dominates the outcome of the random
dictatorship. Note that the relationship between MD and the next axiom is like
the relationship between the IR and INIR axioms. IR and INIR are based on d,
while MD and INMD are based on m.
Independence of Non-Midpoint-Dominating Alternatives (INMD):
For all (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿; if IR(S;m(S;d)) = IR(T;m(T;d)); then f(S;d) =
f(T;d):
If the hypothesis IR(S;m(S;d)) = IR(T;m(T;d)) holds, then m(S;d) = m(T;d)
and b(S;d) = b(T;d): INMD states that parties should focus on the alternatives
dominating the midpoint.
We introduce four prominent solution concepts, the Nash, Kalai/Smorodinsky,
Discrete Rai⁄a, and Proportional solutions.
The Nash solution N: For each (S;d) 2 ￿; N(S;d) = argmaxf(x1￿d1)(x2￿
d2)jx 2 IR(S;d)g:
The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution KS: For each (S;d) 2 ￿; KS(S;d) =
maxfu 2 Sj there exists ￿ 2 [0;1] such that u = ￿b(S;d) + (1 ￿ ￿)dg:
The Discrete Rai⁄a solution DR: For each (S;d) 2 ￿; consider a non-
decreasing sequence fmtg 2 S with m0 = m(S;d) and mt = m(S;mt￿1); then
DR(S;d) = limt!1 mt:
The Proportional solution P: For each (S;d) 2 ￿; there are strictly positive
constants p1 and p2 such that f(S;d) = d + ￿(S;d)p, where p = (p1;p2) and
￿(S;d) = maxftjtp 2 S ￿ dg:
124 The Robustness of Intermediate Agreements
(RIA) Axioms
Consider the following axiom of Kalai (1977):
Step-by-step Negotiations (SSN): For all (S;d); (T;d) 2 ￿; such that
T ￿ S and (S ￿ f(T;d);0) 2 ￿; f(S;d) = f(T;d) + f(S ￿ f(T;d);0):
SSN is a very robust requirement and Kalai (1977) demonstrated that, when
combined with WPO and SIR, it is su¢ cient to uniquely characterize the Propor-
tional solutions.
Recall from the last section that D(S;d;f) represents the set of all common
intermediate agreements d0 in S dominating d, such that, if we replace the initial
disagreement point d with d0, we still reach the same bargaining outcome. To link
our axioms to SSN conceptually, we restate SSN as follows:
Given two problems (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿; whenever S ￿ T; f(S;d) ￿ d and
(T;f(S;d)) 2 ￿; then D(T;d;f) ￿ ff(S;d)g:
For a given problem (T;d); SSN requires that D(T;d;f) is not only non-empty,
but also contains f(S;d) for all problems (S;d) 2 ￿, with S ￿ T and (T;f(S;d)) 2
￿: In other words, f(S;d) can serve as an intermediate agreement in reaching
f(T;d). However, as we argued in the Introduction, one would not expect parties
to reach intermediate agreements ￿ and especially the solution outcome of S as an
intermediate agreement ￿ even if they knew that the ultimate outcome T would
contain S, unless some additional things about the relationship between S and T
were also known.
Next, we propose four fairly intuitive axioms that are closely related to SSN
but provide weaker robustness tests. All axioms consider the situation where two
parties face an uncertain bargaining prospect with (S;d) and (T;d) as possible
13problems.
1. The ￿rst axiom, RIA-Inclusion, is a weaker version of SSN. As in SSN,
the bargaining sets S and T are nested. However, RIA-Inclusion only requires the
disagreement point set D(T;d;f) of the larger utility possibility set T to include
the disagreement point set D(S;d;f) of the smaller set S.
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements with Inclusion (RIA-Inclusion):
For all (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿ such that S ￿ T;D(S;d;f) ￿ D(T;d;f):16
In other words, RIA-Inclusion does not require the solution outcome, f(S;d),
of the smaller set S to necessarily be an intermediate agreement. It only states
that in this case the parties will be willing to reach any point d0 2 D(S;d;f) as an
intermediate agreement instead of sticking to the status quo d. This intermediate
agreement is robust, in that the bargaining outcome remains unchanged in either
problem when the agents move from d to d0: Thus, certain points can serve as
robust intermediate agreements when S and T are nested.
2. Now, consider two parties facing a bargaining situation where ￿ unlike in
SSN and RIA-Inclusion ￿ the bargaining sets need not be nested. Apart from the
disagreement outcome d, assume that the parties also know the maximal utility
each of them can receive (i.e., the ideal point), but are uncertain about the Pareto
optimal frontier. Therefore, they can not reach a ￿nal outcome yet. In this case
also they will be willing to reach an intermediate agreement d0 instead of sticking
to the status quo. As in the RIA-Inclusion axiom, the intermediate agreement d0
should be robust. Accordingly, we must have \(S;d)2￿b;dD(S;d;f)nfdg 6= ;; where
￿b;d is the collection of all problems in ￿ with ideal point b and disagreement point
d. The axiom stated below is a weaker version of this requirement.17
16To see that RIA-Inclusion is weaker than SSN, pick any e d 2 D(S;d;f) (if it exists). SSN
implies that f(T; e d) = f(T;f(S; e d)) = f(T;f(S;d)) = f(T;d):
17The terms ff(S;d)g and ff(T;d)g can be dropped if we work with an enlarged domain by
14Robustness of Intermediate Agreements in the (d;b)-Box (RIA-Box):
For all (S;d); (T;d) 2 ￿ such that b(S;d) = b(T;d); (D(S;d;f) [ ff(S;d)g) \
(D(T;d;f) [ ff(T;d)g)nfdg 6= ;:
RIA-Box only requires that each pair of problems with the same disagreement
point and ideal point have a non-empty intersection of their disagreement point
sets union the ￿nal outcomes.18 The agents know d and b, but they do not know
whether they will face S or T. Again, we want them to be able to reach an
intermediate agreement d0 > d in that whether S or T is realized tomorrow, the
agents should be able to move from d0 or d to f(S;d) or f(T;d). Thus, this
robustness criterion states that certain points can serve as robust intermediate
agreements when (S;d) and (T;d) share the same ideal point. Note that RIA-
Box is satis￿ed by the Proportional solutions (including both the Egalitarian and
Dictatorial solutions), as well as by the Discrete Rai⁄a solution.
3. Our third and fourth robustness criteria concern the concept of bargaining
power. Both criteria state that a robust intermediate agreement exists when parties
have the same relative bargaining power in S and T. Intuitively, when two parties
face an uncertain bargaining circumstance, they agree to reach an intermediate
agreement d0 only if d and d0 give them the same relative bargaining position
(power) for later negotiations. When (S;d) and (T;d) are very divergent, it may
be di¢ cult to ￿nd an intermediate agreement that gives them the same relative
bargaining power as d does. On the contrary, if (S;d) and (T;d) are homogenous in
that both parties have the same relative bargaining power in both (S;d) and (T;d);
then we should expect them to reach an intermediate agreement easily. The only
allowing d to be on the boundary of the bargaining set.
18The axiom can be modi￿ed to hold for all (S;d) 2 ￿ instead of for only two problems









thing remaining is to determine how the parties perceive their relative bargaining
power. In the following, we suggest two measures of bargaining power.
It may not be clear ex-ante what kinds of economic and non-economic factors
will determine a party￿ s bargaining power relative to that of the other. Neverthe-
less, it should be clear ex-post that one party￿ s gain in a negotiation relative to
the other￿ s must increase monotonically with respect to that party￿ s bargaining
power relative to that of the other. This simple idea inspires our ￿rst de￿nition
of bargaining power. It is as follows: For any x;y 2 R2 and x 6= y; let l[x;y] be
the line segment connecting x and y; and ￿(x;y) be the gradient (slope) of l[x;y]:
Suppose that the solution outcome is f(S;d) ￿ d for a given problem (S;d): Then
the gradient ￿(d;f(S;d)); which measures the relative gains in bargaining, could
be an appropriate index of bargaining power (see Figure 1).
Observe that ￿(d;f(S;d)) = 0 implies that Agent 1 has absolute bargaining
power, ￿(d;f(S;d)) = 1 implies that Agent 2 has absolute bargaining power,
and Agent 1￿ s bargaining power decreases monotonically with ￿. If ￿(d;f(S;d)) =










Robustness of Intermediate Agreements with Identical Relative Gains
(RIA-Gains): For all (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿; if (i) f(S;d) 2 IR(S;d)nfdg and f(T;d) 2
IR(T;d)nfdg and (ii) ￿(d;f(S;d)) = ￿(d;f(T;d)); then D(S;d;f)\D(T;d;f)nfdg 6=
;:
Beginning with the same disagreement point d, if two parties perceive (cor-
rectly) that they will receive the same relative gains in two problems (S;d) and
(T;d); then there exists at least one allocation d0 in S \ T that is agreeable to
both parties as an intermediate agreement. As in the previous two RIA axioms,
this intermediate agreement d0 > d should be robust, in that whether S or T is
realized tomorrow, the agents should be able to move from either d0 or d to f(S;d)
or f(T;d). Any such d0 therefore needs to be a common intermediate agreement
in D(S;d;f) \ D(T;d;f). It is easy to see that RIA-Gains is satis￿ed by the
Proportional solutions, as well as the Nash solution.
4. Our last RIA axiom, RIA-Concessions, is built on a measure of the relative
concessions parties make. Suppose that two parties have reached an agreement.
17This outcome can be viewed as a compromise that balances their concessions. A
particular party￿ s concessions are feasible outcomes ￿ measured in a particular
way that both parties agree on ￿ that a party prefers to the negotiated outcome.
Thus, concessions can be considered as bargaining chips here; possessing more
bargaining chips in a particular negotiation would then yield more bargaining
power to a party.
Suppose that the parties￿environment now changes in such a way that new
potential outcomes, mostly bene￿cial to Agent 1, have been added to the feasible
set. Then, from both parties￿points of view, maintaining the original compromise
would amount to Agent 1 making relatively greater concessions than before. This
in turn would give Agent 1 more bargaining power in the new environment. If the
initial compromise was reached by ￿balancing￿the concessions made by one party
against those made by the other, then maintaining the original payo⁄ ratio will
result in an ￿imbalance￿of concessions, and therefore at least one party ￿ Agent
1 ￿ will think that the original payo⁄ ratio should no longer remain intact.
However, if the new environment is such that the new potential outcomes are
equally bene￿cial to both parties (given the way in which parties agree to measure
concessions), then maintaining the original payo⁄ ratio still results in an outcome
balancing relative concessions and thus relative bargaining powers. In that regard,
￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(S;d)) can be used to measure the parties￿relative concessions and
relative bargaining powers in (T;f(S;d)) with respect to f(S;d). As in RIA-Box
and RIA-Gains, S and T need not include one another.
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements with Identical Relative Con-
cessions (RIA-Concessions): For all (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿; if (i) f(S;d) 2 IR(S;d)nfdg
and f(T;d) 2 IR(T;d)nfdg and (ii) ￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(T;d)) = ￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(S;d));











if b(T;d) 2 T:19
In two problems (S;d) and (T;d); parties should not expect that their bar-
gaining power will change if the added relative concessions are the same as before,
i.e., when ￿(b(T;f(S;d)); f(T;d)) = ￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(S;d)) (see Figure 3). RIA-
Concessions requires that there exists at least one allocation d0 in S \ T that is
agreeable to both parties as an intermediate agreement when they perceive to make
the same relative concessions in two problems.
19The last requirement ￿fi(T;d) = bi(T;d) for some i only if b(T;d) 2 T￿is there to guarantee
that b(T;x) 6= f(T;d) will hold for all x 2 IR(T;d)nff(T;d)g; otherwise ￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(T;d))
may not be well-de￿ned. This condition can be dropped if we restrict the domain of bargaining
problems to be non-level or replace DCONT with PCONT in characterizing KS.
195 Characterizations of the Discrete Rai⁄a, Nash,
Kalai/Smorodinsky, and Proportional Solutions
5.1 The Discrete Rai⁄a Solution
As was mentioned earlier, RIA-Box is satis￿ed by all Proportional solutions, as well
as by the Discrete Rai⁄a solution. It is also known that MD is satis￿ed by the Nash,
Kalai/Smorodinsky, Discrete Rai⁄a, Equal Area, and Average Payo⁄ solutions.
As has also been mentioned, INMD is satis￿ed by the Nash, Kalai/Smorodinsky,
Discrete Rai⁄a and Dictatorial solutions. The following is the ￿rst axiomatic
characterization of the Discrete Rai⁄a solution. All proofs from this section are
relegated to the Appendix, Part A.
Proposition 1 DR is the unique solution satisfying INMD, MD and RIA-Box.
Thus, given INMD and MD, if two parties, whenever they face an uncertain
bargaining situation with two possible underlying feasible sets with the same dis-
agreement point d and ideal point b, are willing to reach intermediate agreements,
then the bargaining outcome must be DR.
5.2 The Nash Solution
Recall that the RIA-Gains axiom is satis￿ed by all Proportional solutions and
the Nash solution. MD is satis￿ed by a signi￿cant number of solutions, as was
mentioned above, while DCONT, which is even more innocuous, is satis￿ed by all
known solutions.
RIA-Gains is closely related to the axiom of Disagreement Point Convexity
introduced by Peters and Van Damme (1991):
20Disagreement Point Convexity (DPC): f(S;￿d+(1￿￿)f(S;d)) = f(S;d)
for all ￿ 2 (0;1):
DPC requires that D(S;d;f) ￿ l(d;f(S;d)): If the premises of RIA-Gains hold,
then DPC implies that D(S;d;f)\D(T;d;f) ￿ l(d;minff(S;d);f(T;d)g):20 DPC
therefore implies RIA-Gains. However, the following example shows that RIA-
Gains does not imply DPC. Consider the ￿-egalitarian solution, E￿, de￿ned as
follows: (1) if E￿
1(S;d)￿d1 = E￿
2(S;d)￿d2 ￿ ￿, it assigns (E￿
1(S;d)￿￿;E￿
2(S;d)￿￿);
where ￿ > 0; (2) if E￿
1(S;d) ￿ d1 = E￿
2(S;d) ￿ d2 < ￿, it assigns d.21 E￿ satis￿es
DCONT and RIA-Gains, but violates DPC.
Proposition 2 N is the unique solution satisfying DCONT, MD and RIA-Gains.22
Thus, given DCONT and MD, if two parties, whenever they face an uncer-
tain bargaining environment consisting of two possible feasible sets with the same
disagreement point d, are willing to reach intermediate agreements provided that
they receive the same relative utility gains over these two possible problems, then
the bargaining outcome must be N, the compromise that maximizes the product
of their utility gains.
Remark 1 Peters and Van Damme (1991) demonstrate that N is the unique solu-
tion satisfying INIR, SIR, DCONT, SYM, SI and DPC. The following proposition
improves on their result, because DPC implies RIA-Gains but not vice versa.
Proposition 3 N is the unique solution satisfying INIR, SIR, DCONT, SYM, SI
and RIA-Gains.
20Note that minff(S;d);f(T;d)g is well-de￿ned when ￿(d;f(S;d)) = ￿(d;f(T;d)):
21E(S;d) stands for the Egalitarian solution.
22DCONT is merely a technical condition and can be dropped if we modify the axiom of
RIA-Gains slightly. Please see the Appendix, Part B.
21Proof. It is straightforward to show that SIR, DCONT, SYM, SI and RIA-Gains
together imply DPC.
5.3 The Kalai/Smorodinsky Solution
SDM is satis￿ed by the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution, as well as by the Equal Area
and Average Payo⁄ solutions. We have already elaborated on the number of so-
lutions satisfying MD and DCONT. Imposing these axioms, together with RIA-
Concessions, yields a characterization of the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution:
Proposition 4 KS is the unique solution satisfying SDM, DCONT, MD and
RIA-Concessions.23;24
Given SDM, DCONT, and MD, if two parties, whenever they face an uncer-
tain bargaining situation with two possible underlying feasible sets with the same
disagreement point d, are willing to reach intermediate agreements provided that
they have the same relative concessions over these two possible problems, then the
bargaining outcome must be KS.
Remark 2 It can readily be seen that the axiom of MD can be replaced by PO in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 KS is the unique solution satisfying SDM, DCONT, PO and RIA-
Concessions.
23As mentioned before, DCONT is merely a technical condition. It can be dropped if we
modify the axiom of RIA-Concessions slightly. Please see the Appendix, Part B.
24Note that SDM, rather than the weaker version DM, is required in the characterization of
KS. However, even though N does not satisfy SDM in ￿; it nevertheless does satisfy it in ￿s.
Hence, one clearly cannot distinguish KS, N, and DR from each other ￿ at least in ￿s ￿ on
the basis of SDM solely.
225.4 Proportional Solutions
DCONT, PCONT, SIR and WPO are satis￿ed by all known solution concepts. As
was mentioned earlier, RIA-Inclusion is weaker than SSN. By imposing DCONT,
PCONT, SIR, WPO and RIA-Inclusion together, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 P is the only class of solutions satisfying DCONT, PCONT, SIR,
WPO and RIA-Inclusion.
Given DCONT, PCONT, SIR and WPO, if two parties, whenever they face an
uncertain bargaining circumstance with two possible underlying problems with the
same disagreement point d, are willing to reach intermediate agreements as long as
the two problems S and T are nested, then the bargaining outcome must be P.25
We can now fully summarize our results:
DR RIA-Box MD INMD
N RIA-Gains MD DCONT
KS RIA-Concessions MD DCONT SDM
P RIA-Inclusion DCONT PCONT+WPO+SIR
That is, beside MD and RIA-Box, the Discrete Rai⁄a solution￿ s axiomatic char-
acterization uses only one more axiom, INMD. In addition MD and RIA-Gains, the
Nash solution￿ s characterization likewise involves only one more axiom, DCONT.
Beside MD and RIA-Concessions, the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution￿ s characteriza-
25Rachmilevitch (2009) recently wrote an interesting note on our paper, which at that time had
not yet incorporated the characterization of the Proportional solutions. Rachmilevitch used IR,
SYM, a slightly weaker version of DCONT, ￿ Translation Invariance￿and a new axiom, ￿ Interim
Improvement￿ , to characterize the Egalitarian solution. His Interim Improvement axiom and our
RIA-Inclusion axioms do not imply one another.
23tion uses DCONT and SDM. Beside RIA-Inclusion, the Proportional solutions￿
characterizations use WPO, DCONT, PCONT and SIR.
6 Conclusion
Although there have been earlier non-uni￿ed attempts to bring the bargaining
process into Nash￿ s bargaining problem (via the SSN axiom of Kalai, 1977, and the
MD axiom of Sobel, 1981), previous characterizations of solutions have typically
relied on crucial axioms entailing changes in the utility possibility set and in the
disagreement point, and have not described any bargaining process. In this paper,
we relax the strong robustness criterion of SSN, and thereby highlight, in a uni￿ed
way, the crucial role played by the robustness of the intermediate agreements (and
the resulting bargaining process) which we propose here. By describing plausible
circumstances under which such robust intermediate agreements can be obtained,
our Robustness of Intermediate Agreements (RIA) axioms portray a bargaining
process.
A major accomplishment of our formulation is the novel axiomatic characteri-
zation of the Discrete Rai⁄a solution, which had previously eluded researchers. All
of our characterizations, except for that of the Proportional solutions, involve both
MD and an RIA axiom, which each pertain to di⁄erent aspects of the bargaining
process.
This uni￿ed approach aims to bridge the gap between the axiomatic and strate-
gic approaches to bargaining. The use of robustness of intermediate agreements is
certainly one fruitful way of bringing these two approaches together.
247 Appendix
7.1 Part A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. It is obvious that DR satis￿es these three axioms.
Suppose that f satis￿es INMD, MD and RIA-Box. We show that f = DR: Let
(S;d) 2 ￿: By the convexity of S; m(S;d) 2 S. If m(S;d) 2 PO(S); then by MD
f(S;d) = m(S;d) = DR(S;d): Now suppose that m(S;d) = 2 PO(S): By the con-
vexity of S again, m(S;d) = 2 WPO(S), and hence, (S;m(S;d)) 2 ￿: To show that
f(S;d) = DR(S;d) in this case, it is su¢ cient to show that f(S;d) = f(S;m(S;d)):
Consider the problem (T;d), where T = convfd;(d1;b2(S;d));(b1(S;d);d2)g:26 By
MD, (i) f(T;d) = m(S;d); and (ii) D(T;d;f) = l[d;m(S;d)): By RIA-Box, there
exists a common intermediate agreement a 2 l[d;m(S;d)) [ fm(S;d)g such that
f(S;d) = f(S;a): INMD excludes all points below m(S;d) from being a common
intermediate agreement. Hence, a = m(S;d):
Proof of Proposition 2. It is obvious that N satis￿es these three axioms. We
will show that if f satis￿es these three axioms, then f = N. The proof is based
on the following nice characterization of the Nash solution by de Clippel (2007).
Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 of de Clippel, 2007) N is the unique solution satisfying
MD and DPC.
With this Lemma in hand, it is su¢ cient to show that DCONT, MD and RIA-
Gains imply DPC. Let (S;d) 2 ￿: By MD, f(S;d) > d: Consider the problem
(T ";d), where T " = convfd;(2f1(S;d) ￿ d1 ￿ "
f2(S;d)￿d2;d2);(d1;2f2(S;d) ￿ d2 ￿
"
f1(S;d)￿d1)g. By MD, (i) f(T ";d) = (f1(S;d) ￿ "
2(f2(S;d)￿d2);f2(S;d) ￿ "
2(f1(S;d)￿d1));
which in turn implies that ￿(d;f(S;d)) = ￿(d;f(T ";d)); and (ii) D(T ";d;f) =
26Note that ￿conv￿denotes ￿the convex hull of.￿
25l[d;(f1(S;d) ￿ "
2(f2(S;d)￿d2);f2(S;d) ￿ "
2(f1(S;d)￿d1))): By RIA-Gains, at least one
point a1 2 l(d;(f1(S;d) ￿ "
2(f2(S;d)￿d2);f2(S;d) ￿ "
2(f1(S;d)￿d1))) is in the disagree-
ment point set of (S;d) with respect to f: Starting with a1 as a new disagreement
point and repeating the argument above gives us a strictly increasing sequence
fang such that an 2 D(S;d;f) 8n: By RIA-Gains and DCONT, limn!1 an =
(f1(S;d) ￿ "
2(f2(S;d)￿d2);f2(S;d) ￿ "
2(f1(S;d)￿d1)). Invoking DCONT and RIA-Gains
again, (f1(S;d) ￿ "
2(f2(S;d)￿d2);f2(S;d) ￿ "
2(f1(S;d)￿d1)) 2 D(S;d;f): Letting " vary
from 0 to 2(f1(S;d) ￿ d1)(f2(S;d) ￿ d2) gives us DPC.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is straightforward to show that KS satis￿es these
four axioms. Suppose that f satis￿es SDM, DCONT, MD and RIA-Concessions.
We will show that f = KS holds. The proof consists of two steps:
(I) If T = convfd;(d1 + a;d2);(d1;d2 + c);(d1 + a;d2 + c)g for some a;c > 0;
then f(T;d) = b(T;d) = (d1+a;d2+c): Suppose on the other hand that f(T;d) 6=
(d1+a;d2+c): By MD, f(T;d) ￿ m(T;d) > d: Denote by L(f(T;d);(d1+a;d2+c))
the straight line going through f(T;d) and (d1 +a;d2 +c); and de￿ne ￿ ￿ inffx ￿
m(T;d)j x 2 L(f(T;d);(d1 + b;d2 + c))g: As the partial order ￿ in R2 induces a
linear order in L(f(T;d);(d1 + b;d2 + c)); ￿ is well-de￿ned. There are two cases:
(i) ￿ = m(T;d): Consider the problem (W;d) with W = convfd;(d1+a;d2);(d1;d2+
c)g: Notice that b(T;d) = b(W;d) = (d1 + a;d2 + c): By MD, (a) f(W;d) = (d1 +
a
2;d2+c
2) = m(T;d); and (b) D(W;d;f) = l[d;m(T;d)): Accordingly, ￿(b(T;f(W;d));f(T;d)) =
￿(b(T;f(W;d));f(W;d)); and by RIA-Concessions there exists y1 2 l(d;m(T;d))
such that f(T;d) = f(T;y1) and f(W;d) = f(W;y1): Applying RIA-Concessions
repeatedly, we get a strictly increasing sequence fyig, with yi 2 l(d;m(T;d)) such
that f(T;d) = f(T;yi) and f(W;d) = f(W;yi) for all i. By DCONT and RIA-
Concessions, limyi = m(T;d): Consequently, by DCONT, f(T;d) = f(T;m(T;d)):
Taking m(T;d) as a new disagreement point and iteratively applying the equation
26f(T;d) = f(T;m(T;d)) shows that f(T;d) = (d1 + a;d2 + c); contradicting our
premise that f(T;d) 6= (d1 + a;d2 + c):
(ii) If ￿ 6= m(T;d); then either ￿ = (￿;m2(T;d)) for some ￿ 2 (m1(T;d);d1+a]
or ￿ = (m1(T;d);￿) for some ￿ 2 (m2(T;d);d2 + c]: Without loss of generality,
assume that ￿ = (￿;m2(T;d)) for some ￿ 2 (m1(T;d);d1 + a]: There are two
sub-cases:
Subcase 1. ￿ 2 (m1(T;d);d1 + a): Consider the problem (￿;d); where ￿ ￿
convfd;(2￿ ￿ d1;d2);(d1;d2 + c)g: Following the same steps as in (i), we have
￿ 2 D(T;d;f): We then take ￿ as a new disagreement point and iteratively apply
the equation f(T;￿) = f(T;m(T;￿)); concluding that f(T;d) = (d1 + a;d2 + c):
Subcase 2. ￿ = d1 + a: Consider the problem (￿;d); where ￿ = convfd;(d1 +
2a;d2);(d1;d2 + c)g: m(￿;d) = ￿, but note that (T;￿) = 2 ￿: Nevertheless, using
the same argument as in (i), we are still able to get a strictly increasing sequence
fxig with limi!1 xi = ￿ such that xi 2 D(T;d;f) for all i. By MD, f1(T;d) =
d1 + a and f2(T;d) ￿ 1
2m2(T;m(T;d)). Taking xi su¢ ciently close to ￿ as a
new disagreement point and invoking the standard limiting argument (recursively)
shows that f2(T;d) = d2 + c: Therefore, f(T;d) = (d1 + a;d2 + c).
(II) Let (S;d) 2 ￿: If b(S;d) 2 S; then IR(S;d) = convfd;(d1;b2(S;d));
(b1(S;d);d2);b(S;d)g. Therefore, f(S;d) = b(S;d) = KS(S;d) from (I): As-
sume now that b(S;d) = 2 S: By MD, f(S;d) ￿ m(S;d): We now show that
f(S;d) 2 PO(S): Suppose on the other hand that f(S;d) = 2 PO(S): Consider the
problem (W;d), where W = convfd;(2f1(S;d) ￿ d1;d2);(d1;2f2(S;d) ￿ d2)g: By
MD, f(W;d) = f(S;d). Hence ￿(b(S;f(W;d));f(S;d)) = ￿(b(S;f(W;d));f(W;d)):
Repeatedly invoking RIA-Concessions and DCONT gives us a strictly increasing
sequence fxig with limi!1 xi = f(S;d) such that xi 2 D(S;d;f) for all i. Conse-
quently, by MD, f(S;d) 2 PO(S).
De￿ne ￿ ￿ fx 2 IR(S;d)j ￿(b(S;x);f(S;d)) = ￿(b(S;x);x) and x ￿ f(S;d)g:
27Since fi(S;d) 6= bi(S;d); ￿nff(S;d)g is non-empty. It can be shown that either
￿ \ fx 2 IR(S;d)jx1 = d1g 6= ; or ￿ \ fx 2 IR(S;d)jx2 = d2g 6= ;: There are two
cases to be considered:
(i) If d 2 ￿; then f(S;d) = l[d;b(S;d)] \ PO(S) = KS:
(ii) If d = 2 ￿; then either (￿;d2) 2 ￿ for some ￿ 2 (d1;f1(S;d)) or (d1;￿) for
some ￿ 2 (d2;f2(S;d)): Without loss of generality, assume (￿;d2) 2 ￿ for some
￿ 2 (d1;f1(S;d)): It is straightforward to show that by MD, DCONT and RIA-
Concessions, ￿n(f(S;d) [ (￿;d2)) ￿ D(S;d;f). By DCONT, (￿;d2) 2 D(S;d;f);
which violates SDM as ￿ > d1. Therefore, d 2 ￿ and f = KS:
Proof of Proposition 6. It can easily be seen that P satis￿es these ￿ve ax-
ioms. Suppose that f satis￿es DCONT, PCONT, SIR, WPO and RIA-Inclusion;
we then show that f = P. It is su¢ cient to show that DCONT, PCONT, SIR,
WPO and RIA-Inclusion imply SSN. Denote by ￿nl ￿ ￿ the class of all prob-
lems that are non-level (see de Clippel, 2007). Every (S;d) 2 ￿ can be approxi-
mated by a sequence of problems in ￿nl: Then, by PCONT, it is su¢ cient to show
that the claim is true in ￿nl: Let (S;d) and (T;d) in ￿nl such that S ￿ T and
(T;f(S;d)) 2 ￿nl: First we show that there is a sequence fdng with dn 2 D(S;d;f)
such that limn!1 dn = f(S;d): Denote by B￿(y) = fx 2 R2jkx ￿ yk < ￿g the
open ball of radius ￿ > 0 centered at y: For any given ￿ > 0; we show that
B￿(f(S;d)) \ D(S;d;f) 6= ;: Pick any z 2 B￿(f(S;d)) \ l(d;f(S;d)): By SIR,
z < f(S;d). If f(S;z) = f(S;d); the claim is established. Suppose now that
f(S;z) 6= f(S;d): Assume without loss of generality that f1(S;z) > f1(S;d); then
by WPO, f2(S;z) ￿ f2(S;d). De￿ne ￿ ￿ (z1;f2(S;d)) 2 B￿(f(S;d)): Since
S is non-level, (S;￿) 2 ￿; by SIR f2(S;￿) > f2(S;d), and hence, by WPO,
f1(S;￿) ￿ f1(S;d). f(S;l[z;￿]) ￿ WPO(S): Since l[z;￿] is connected (in the
Hausdor⁄ topology), and, by DCONT, f(S;￿) is continuous, f(S;l[z;￿]) is con-
28nected. Consequently, there exists ￿ 2 l[z;￿] such that f(S;￿) = f(S;d): As ￿
is arbitrary, we can ￿nd a sequence fdng such that dn 2 D(S;d;f) for all n and
limn!1 dn = f(S;d): Then, by RIA-Inclusion, dn 2 D(T;d;f) for all n; DCONT
completes the proof.
7.2 Part B: ￿￿RIA Results
￿-Robustness of Intermediate Agreements with Identical Relative Gains
(￿-RIA-Gains): Suppose that (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿, and pick any ￿ 2 [0;1): A
solution f satis￿es ￿-RIA-Gains if (i) f(S;d) 2 IR(S;d)nfdg and f(T;d) 2
IR(T;d)nfdg, and (ii) ￿(d;f(S;d)) = ￿(d;f(T;d)) implies that there exists x 2
D(S;d;f) \ D(T;d;f) with x ￿ ￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)minff(S;d);f(T;d)g:
￿-RIA-Gains strengthens RIA-Gains by requiring that at least one common
intermediate agreement which dominates ￿d+(1￿￿)minff(S;d);f(T;d)g exists.
This axiom can be seen as a condition on the speed of convergence. This com-
mon intermediate agreement can be arbitrarily close to d if we pick ￿ su¢ ciently
close to 1. Note that DPC implies ￿-RIA-Gains as well. Therefore, the follow-
ing straightforward extension of Proposition 2 improves Theorem 1 of de Clippel
(2007).
Proposition 7 N is the unique solution satisfying MD and ￿-RIA-Gains for all
￿ 2 (0;1).
￿-Robustness of Intermediate Agreements with Identical Relative
Concessions (￿-RIA-Concessions): Suppose that (S;d);(T;d) 2 ￿ and ￿ 2
[0;1): If (i) f(S;d) 2 IR(S;d)nfdg and f(T;d) 2 IR(T;d)nfdg, and (ii) ￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(T;d)) =
￿(b(T;f(S;d));f(S;d)); then there exists x 2 D(S;d;f) \ D(T;d;f) with x ￿
￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)minff(S;d);f(T;d)g; moreover, fi(T;d) = bi(T;d) for some i only if
b(T;d) 2 T:
29It is straightforward to show the following:
Proposition 8 KS is the unique solution satisfying SDM, MD and ￿-RIA-Concessions.
Proposition 9 KS is the unique solution satisfying SDM, PO and ￿-RIA-Concessions.
References
[1] Anbarci, N. (1993), ￿Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic So-
lution,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 245-258.
[2] Anbarci, N. (1995), ￿Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bar-
gaining,￿Canadian Journal of Economics, 28, 675-682.
[3] Anbarci, N., S. Skaperdas and C. Syropoulos (2002), ￿Comparing Bargaining
Solutions in the Shadow of Con￿ ict: How Norms against Threats Can Have
Real E⁄ects,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 106, 1-16.
[4] Anbarci, N. and J. Bigelow (1994), ￿The Area Monotonic Solution to the
Cooperative Bargaining Problem,￿Mathematical Social Sciences, 28, 133-142.
[5] Anbarci N. and G. Yi (1992), ￿A Meta-Allocation Mechanism in Cooperative
Bargaining,￿Economics Letters, 38, 175-179.
[6] Anbarci, N. and J. Boyd III (2009), ￿Nash Demand Game and the
Kalai/Smorodinsky Solution,￿mimeo, Deakin University and Florida Inter-
national University.
[7] Aumann, R. J. and M. B. Maschler (1985), ￿Game-theoretic Analysis of a
Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud,￿ Journal of Economic Theory, 36,
195-213.
30[8] Bigelow, J. and N. Anbarci (1993), ￿Non-Dictatorial, Pareto-Monotonic, Co-
operative Bargaining: An Impossibility Theorem,￿European Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 9, 551-558.
[9] Binmore, K. G. (1998), Game Theory and the Social Contract II: Just Playing,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[10] Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1986), ￿The Nash Bargaining
Solution in Economic Modeling,￿Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 176-188.
[11] Chiang, J., S. Chib, and C. Narasimhan (1999), ￿Markov Chain Monte Carlo
and Models of Consideration Set and Parameter Heterogeneity,￿Journal of
Econometrics, 89, 223-248.
[12] Chun, Y. (1988), ￿The Equal-loss Principle for Bargaining Problems,￿Eco-
nomics Letters, 26, 103-106.
[13] Chun, Y. and W. Thomson (1990), ￿Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement
Points,￿Econometrica, 58, 951-959.
[14] Dawes, P. L. and Brown, J. (2004), ￿The Composition of Consideration and
Choice Sets in Undergraduate University Choice: An Exploratory Study,￿
Journal of Marketing for Higher Education, 14, 37-59.
[15] de Clippel, G. (2007), ￿An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution,￿
Social Choice and Welfare, 29, 201-210.
[16] Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881), Mathematical Psychics. Kegan Paul Publishers,
London. Reprinted in 2003, P. Newman (ed.) F. Y. Edgeworth￿ s Mathematical
Psychics and Further Papers on Political Economy. Oxford University Press.
31[17] Goeree, M. (2008), ￿Limited Information and Advertising in the US Personal
Computer Industry,￿Econometrica, 76, 1017-1074.
[18] Gul, F. (1989), ￿Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value,￿Econometrica,
57, 81-95.
[19] Howard, J. V. (1992), ￿A Social Choice Rule and Its Implementation in Perfect
Equilibrium,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 142-159.
[20] Huberman, G. and T. Regev (2001), ￿Contagious Speculation and a Cure for
Cancer: A Nonevent That Made Stock Prices Soar,￿Journal of Finance, 56,
387-396.
[21] Kalai, E. (1977), ￿Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interper-
sonal Utility Comparisons,￿Econometrica, 45, 1623-1630.
[22] Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975), ￿Other Solutions to Nash￿ s Bargaining
Problem,￿Econometrica, 43, 513-518.
[23] Livne, Z. (1989), ￿On the Status Quo Sets Induced by the Rai⁄a Solution to
the Two-Person Bargaining Problem,￿Mathematics of Operations Research,
14, 688-692.
[24] Moulin, H. (1983), ￿Le Choix Social Utilitariste,￿Ecole Polytechnique Dis-
cussion Paper.
[25] Moulin, H. (1984), ￿Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solu-
tion,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 33, 32-45.
[26] Nash, J. F. (1950), ￿The Bargaining Problem,￿Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
[27] Nash, J. F. (1953), ￿Two-person Cooperative Games,￿Econometrica, 21, 128-
140.
32[28] Perles, M. A. and M. Maschler (1981), ￿The Super-additive Solution for the
Nash Bargaining Game,￿International Journal of Game Theory, 10, 163-193.
[29] Peters, H. and E. Van Damme (1991), ￿Characterizing the Nash and Rai⁄a
Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms,￿Mathematics of Oper-
ations Research, 16, 447-461.
[30] Rai⁄a, H. (1953), ￿Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games,￿
In H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of
Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 28 (361-387), Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ.
[31] Rachmilevitch, S. (2009), ￿Interim Outcomes in Bargaining and the Egalitar-
ian Solution,￿mimeo, Northwestern University, Department of Economics.
[32] Roth, A. E. (1979a), ￿Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,￿
Econometrica, 47, 775-777.
[33] Roth, A. E. (1979b), Axiomatic models of bargaining, Springer, New York.
[34] Rubinstein, A. and Y. Salant (2006), ￿A Model of Choice From List,￿Theo-
retical Economics, 1, 3-17.
[35] Schwarz, N. (2004), ￿Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and
Decision Making,￿Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14, 332-348.
[36] Sobel, J. (1981), ￿Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem,￿Econo-
metrica, 49, 597-620.
[37] Thomson, W. (1987), ￿Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to
the Disagreement Point,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 50-58.
33[38] Thomson, W. (1994), ￿Cooperative Models of Bargaining,￿In R. J. Aumann
and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
Vol. 2. Elsevier, New York.
[39] van Damme, E. C. C. (1986), ￿The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal,￿
Journal of Economic Theory, 38, 78-100.
34